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ESSAY 
DISCRIMINATION IS A COMPARATIVE INJUSTICE: A REPLY 
TO HELLMAN 
Kenneth W. Simons* 
N Two Concepts of Discrimination, Professor Hellman lucidly and 
systematically explains the difference between comparative and 
noncomparative conceptions of discrimination.1 Although other legal 
scholars and philosophers have addressed the distinction between com-
parative and noncomparative justice,2 she profitably applies the distinc-
tion to current controversies about the meaning and scope of antidis-
crimination norms in statutory and equal protection law. Her approach is 
largely conceptual and interpretive, identifying the categories and rea-
soning that courts and legal scholars have employed. However, she also 
critiques aspects of that reasoning. 
Hellman believes that her analysis illuminates a number of issues in 
contemporary constitutional discrimination jurisprudence. In her view, it 
explains why the supposed clash between equal protection doctrine and 
Title VII’s disparate impact approach is illusory, why equal protection 
 
* Kenneth W. Simons, Chancellor’s Professor of Law & Philosophy, University of Cali-
fornia, Irvine School of Law. 
1 Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 Va. L. Rev. 895, 897 (2016). 
2 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 Phil. Rev. 297, 298 (1974); Kent 
Greenawalt, “Prescriptive Equality”: Two Steps Forward, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1266 
(1997); Raleigh Hannah Levine & Russell Pannier, Comparative and Noncomparative Jus-
tice: Some Guidelines for Constitutional Adjudication, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 141, 188 
n.152 (2005); Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, in The Ideal of Equality 81, 81–125 (Mat-
thew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 
95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 551–52 (1982). 
I
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doctrine is ambivalent about whether irrational government action is 
constitutionally problematic, and why equal protection and due process 
reasoning should only sometimes be combined. 
There is much to admire in Hellman’s article. She carefully elucidates 
important conceptual and doctrinal distinctions, demonstrates a subtle 
and insightful appreciation of the complexities of equal protection doc-
trine, and is scrupulously fair in enunciating arguments that she ulti-
mately rejects. 
This Essay offers some friendly criticisms of her approach. I share her 
belief that the distinction between comparative and noncomparative jus-
tice is critical for understanding constitutional doctrine.3 I disagree, 
however, about how, and even whether, that distinction should apply to 
antidiscrimination norms. And I do not believe that her analysis fully 
succeeds in explaining the three contemporary issues that she highlights. 
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPARATIVE AND NONCOMPARATIVE 
INJUSTICE 
A comparative conception of injustice asserts that whether X has been 
unjustly treated depends on how others have been (or would have been) 
treated. A noncomparative conception asserts that whether X has been 
unjustly treated does not depend on the treatment of others. Hellman ap-
plies this distinction to the moral and legal problem of wrongful discrim-
ination, arguing that courts and scholars have employed both concep-
tions here as well. 
Why does this distinction matter? For several reasons, according to 
Hellman (with which I largely agree). First, for purposes of understand-
ing the scope and content of the right, a comparative right is defined by 
reference to how others are treated. Second, as a substantive matter, 
deeper egalitarian norms explain why this formal or structural feature 
matters morally or legally. Here, Hellman “proposes” that the relevant 
substantive value is the duty to treat people “as equals.”4 This, she sug-
 
3 See Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 387, 450, 
461 (1985) [hereinafter Simons, Comparative Right]; Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of 
Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 693, 709–10, 763 (2000) [hereinafter Simons, Logic]. 
4 Hellman, supra note 1, at 901–03. This formulation, the right to be treated “as an equal,” 
derives from Professor Ronald Dworkin and his notion of the right to be treated with equal 
concern and respect. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 227 (1977) (“If I have 
two children, and one is dying from a disease that is making the other uncomfortable, I do 
not show equal concern if I flip a coin to decide which should have the remaining dose of a 
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gests, is the substantive value upon which our equal protection doctrine 
actually relies.5 However, as we will see, appealing to this particular 
substantive understanding of the norm underlying equal protection is 
more controversial than Hellman may realize. 
Third, Hellman points out that comparative and noncomparative 
rights entail different remedies.6 A comparative injustice can be reme-
died either by leveling up or by leveling down (or, I would add, by any 
intermediate remedy that corrects the inequality7), while remedying a 
noncomparative injustice requires leveling up, in the sense of giving the 
aggrieved person what she is entitled to. Thus, if a judge is sentencing 
two individuals A and B whose participation in a crime is identical in all 
relevant respects, but the judge has discretion to give any sentence be-
tween five and ten years, the judge commits a comparative injustice if he 
sentences A to five years and B to ten years. The inequality can be reme-
died either by increasing A’s sentence to ten years or by decreasing B’s 
to five (or by imposing any equal, intermediate sentence). But if, in a 
different, noncomparative case, a judge sentences C to seven years 
when, as a matter of statutory or constitutional law, C is entitled to a 
five-year sentence, the only proper remedy is to impose the five-year 
sentence. 
I agree that different remedies flow from comparative and noncom-
parative rights,8 but I think that Hellman’s account overstates the differ-
ence. If a noncomparative right actually creates a moral or legal entitle-
ment to a particular treatment (as in the example of C’s sentence), then 
of course it follows that only that treatment satisfies the right. But not all 
noncomparative rights create specific entitlements. In the sentencing ex-
ample, suppose the judge has discretion to sentence C to between three 
 
drug. This example shows that the right to treatment as an equal is fundamental, and the right 
to equal treatment, derivative. In some circumstances the right to treatment as an equal will 
entail a right to equal treatment, but not, by any means, in all circumstances.”). 
5 Hellman, supra note 1, at 902 n.18. 
6 Id. at 917. 
7 See Simons, Logic, supra note 3, at 711. 
8 One important complication here is that the appropriately flexible remedy depends on the 
nature of the comparative right. For example, because it is comparatively unjust to exclude 
black citizens from a public swimming pool, it might seem that the injustice can be remedied 
either by admitting both blacks and whites or instead by closing the pool. See Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971). However, it is also plausible to characterize the action 
of denying a benefit to both blacks and whites for an impermissible racist reason as a com-
parative injustice, as Hellman recognizes. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 917 & n.61; Simons, 
Comparative Right, supra note 3, at 431–33. 
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and five years, and further suppose that a sentence within that range is 
consistent with C’s noncomparative right to be punished according to his 
just deserts. Then, any sentence within that range respects C’s noncom-
parative rights (both C’s right that the sentencing judge respect the statu-
tory limits and C’s right to be treated according to C’s just deserts). And 
conversely, a comparative right can create a specific entitlement. For 
example, if a person violates the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act or the Equal Pay Act, the remedy requires leveling up.9 
Although it should not be controversial that some constitutional and 
legal rights are concerned with comparative injustice and others with 
noncomparative injustice, what is controversial is Hellman’s central 
claim in this article—that the wrong of discrimination can be explicated 
either as comparative or noncomparative. By definition, wrongful dis-
crimination refers to unjustified distinctions between persons. How can 
this wrong be understood as noncomparative? The very basis of the 
complaint is the claimed injustice of differential treatment. As Hellman 
notes, “[T]he independent [noncomparative] conception of discrimina-
tion makes the term ‘discrimination’ lose its moral resonance.”10 
But Hellman is on solid ground in reporting that some scholars and 
judges do appear to characterize the wrong of discrimination as 
noncomparative. This is especially true, she notes, of many advocates of 
an “anticlassification” approach to racial discrimination, an approach 
that treats differential treatment in favor of minorities (such as affirma-
tive action) with as much suspicion or disfavor as differential treatment 
that burdens minorities.11 Those who take this stance sometimes claim 
that it is wrongful for a decision maker (such as a government, universi-
ty, or employer) to consider race in any way in making a decision about 
allocating benefits or burdens. And, at first blush, a right not to have 
race considered in a decision affecting you looks like a noncomparative 
 
9 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012), provides: “It shall 
be unlawful for an employer” to discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s 
age or “to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.” The 
Equal Pay Act, which addresses certain forms of sex discrimination in employment, similar-
ly forbids leveling down as a remedy. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) 
(“[A]n employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall 
not, in order to comply with the [nondiscrimination] provisions of this subsection, reduce the 
wage rate of any employee.”). 
10 Hellman, supra note 1, at 909. 
11 Id. at 914–17. 
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right: We need not examine how others are treated in order to determine 
whether your right was violated. 
Nevertheless, I believe that it is implausible to characterize a sup-
posed right to be free of race-based or gender-based decision making as 
a noncomparative right. At the same time, the reasons why this charac-
terization might seem plausible deserve careful attention, for they reveal 
a greater complexity in the structure and justification of comparative 
rights than first appears. 
Let us examine more closely the claim that a right to have race ig-
nored is a noncomparative right. How would this claim arise? A white 
applicant to a university complains that he was rejected while a minority 
applicant with the same qualifications was admitted. This, of course, is a 
complaint of unfair comparative disadvantage. Take away that disad-
vantage and the complaint evaporates. The complaint is not that race 
was considered simpliciter. It is that race was considered to the com-
plainant’s detriment.12 
I suspect that Hellman finds a comparative account of the “color-
blind” principle to be unpersuasive because she finds the principle itself 
unpersuasive. However, the question she is addressing is not normative 
(whether the principle itself is justifiable), but interpretive (how advo-
cates of the principle explain and justify it). Many advocates of the prin-
ciple do interpret it as a comparative principle, forbidding (or subjecting 
to serious scrutiny) any classification that disadvantages persons on the 
basis of race, and it is indeed a coherent exemplar of a comparative 
right. Other advocates worry that permitting racial preferences will ag-
gravate racial and social divisions,13 will stigmatize the recipients as in-
 
12 Hellman states: 
The anticlassification approach isn’t focused on the comparison between two cases—
on the fact that X, a white applicant, is rejected while Y, a comparable black applicant, 
is accepted. Rather the focus of the anticlassification approach is on the single case 
and the fact that race was a factor that affected its outcome. 
Id. at 917. But, in order for race to “affect the outcome,” it must be the case that some indi-
viduals were advantaged or disadvantaged by race relative to others. Moreover, it is difficult 
to believe that most critics of affirmative action and other preferential treatment programs 
are unconcerned with the fact that nonpreferred applicants lose a benefit that preferred appli-
cants obtain. 
13 Justice Powell raises this concern in his opinion in Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298–99 (1978), discussed below: “Disparate constitutional toler-
ance of [benign as opposed to invidious racial] classifications well may serve to exacerbate 
racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them.” Similarly, in the Supreme Court’s 
most recent affirmative action decision, the dissent characterizes the use of racial criteria as 
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ferior,14 or will require the use of offensive racial criteria reminiscent of 
Nazi criteria for identifying Jews.15 These, too, are justifications based 
on the comparative conception of discrimination, for they focus on the 
perceived undesirable, inegalitarian effects of permitting race-conscious 
programs. Although I ultimately share Hellman’s view that the “color-
blind” principle is not the best understanding of our constitutional doc-
trine or of the egalitarian norms that should govern us, these are entirely 
different questions. 
We have seen that the typical complaint against programs of racial 
preference depends on the complainant suffering a detriment relative to 
the preferred group. But can we imagine a case in which a racial classi-
fication is employed yet members of a particular race are not disadvan-
taged? Suppose that in 2017, the IRS requires blacks to file taxes on 
April 1, and whites on April 15. The following year, whites must file on 
April 1, and blacks on April 15, and so on for future years. This policy 
does seem troublesome, and perhaps it does reflect a noncomparative 
right not to have race employed as a criterion in government decision 
making.16 However, the difficulty of constructing an example of this sort 
suggests two things. First, I seriously doubt that the principal concern of 
those who object to affirmative action programs is the mere use of race. 
Rather, they are disturbed by the favorable treatment of minority appli-
cants relative to white applicants in securing a competitive position 
(such as a job or admission to a university). Second, even in this unusual 
IRS example, the reason that the use of an explicit racial classification is 
troublesome is, at least in part, a concern about unjustified inequality. 
The social significance of racial categories in American history cannot 
 
“noxious” and “pernicious.” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981, slip op. at 32, 51 
(U.S. June 23, 2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
14 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
15 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he very attempt to define with precision a beneficiary’s qualifying racial characteristics 
is repugnant to our constitutional ideals. . . . If the National Government is to make a serious 
effort to define racial classes by criteria that can be administered objectively, it must study 
precedents such as the First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 
1935 . . . .”). Justice Stevens then describes the Nuremberg laws, which defined “Jew” ac-
cording to such criteria as parentage, marriage, and belonging to a Jewish religious commu-
nity. Id. at 534–35 n.5.  
16 This example bears some similarity to Professor Paul Brest’s famous example of a 
school principal instructing black students to sit on the left side of the auditorium and white 
students on the right side for purportedly aesthetic reasons. In Hellman’s view, such an order 
demeans black students. Deborah Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? 25–27 (2008). 
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2016] Response to Professor Hellman 91 
be overstated. In light of that tragic and divisive history, employing ra-
cial categories for administrative convenience when so many other, less 
divisive categories could just as easily be used is problematic: It demon-
strates indifference to that history and might perpetuate and aggravate 
racial divisions. In short, I believe that the deeper explanation for our 
unease at employing racial categories, even those that do not create win-
ners and losers, is an egalitarian, comparative principle. 
To be sure, some advocates of the color-blind or anticlassification 
view articulate another rationale for their view: the principle that citizens 
should be treated as individuals, rather than as members of a racial 
group. Hellman reminds us that this was an important rationale for Jus-
tice Lewis Powell’s famous and dispositive opinion in the affirmative 
action case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.17 Hellman 
characterizes this rationale as noncomparative. I demur. The rationale is 
comparative, because it rests on the impropriety of treating a person as 
equal to others in the same (racial) category. At the same time, the un-
derlying claim of comparative right here is not to equal treatment or 
treatment as an equal. Rather, the claim is to be treated differently from 
others in the category, in accordance with and in proportion to one’s in-
dividual (nonracial) characteristics.18 
Like Hellman, I believe that the supposed right to individual treat-
ment is not the best explanation of opposition to preferential treatment 
programs. Opponents surely do not believe that the state is generally 
disabled from using rational but imperfect proxies for relevant qualities, 
such as minimum age requirements for driving or voting, or grade point 
averages and standardized test scores as criteria for university admis-
sion.19 Rather, they judge the use of racial categories to be especially 
problematic. Nevertheless, if someone truly believes that using overin-
clusive categories or failing to consider a wide range of individual char-
acteristics is an affront to justice, it is important to see that this belief 
presupposes a comparative conception of justice.20 
 
17 438 U.S. at 299. 
18 For discussion of the comparative right to proportional treatment, see Simons, Compara-
tive Right, supra note 3, at 437–46. 
19 See Hellman, supra note 16, at 116, 136–37. 
20 The short-lived “irrebuttable presumption” due process doctrine reflected this concern 
about overbroad classifications that fail to treat a person as an individual. See Kenneth W. 
Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 447, 514–18 
(1989). 
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Following her discussion of the supposedly noncomparative right to 
be free from race-based classifications, Hellman turns to a different right 
that, she claims, is grounded in a noncomparative conception of the 
wrong of discrimination—the right to be free from gender stereotyp-
ing.21 She rightly points out that in many gender discrimination cases, 
the Supreme Court focuses not on whether a law relies on a generaliza-
tion that is too loose or inaccurate, but instead on the content of the gen-
eralization, and whether the gender stereotype confines individuals to 
particular gender roles—assuming, for example, that women are more 
caring than men and thus more suitable nurses, or that men are better 
suited for the rough and adversarial educational environment in a mili-
tary academy. Hellman then asserts: “The antistereotyping principle 
found in sex discrimination cases rests on the view that each person 
(male or female) has an independent, noncomparative right to define his 
or her gender identity for him or herself.”22  
The assertion does not follow from Hellman’s analysis. The Court has 
not recognized a general right of an individual to define his or her own 
identity in all respects. Yes, it is plausible to view the Court’s cases as 
recognizing the more specific right to define one’s gender identity, but 
notice that such a right is inherently comparative. It is a right not to be 
limited to “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and 
females”23 such as “the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for fam-
ily members is women’s work.”24 One cannot make sense of the wrong 
of confining individuals to fixed gender roles without appreciating that 
such roles draw distinctions, presumptively treating men differently 
from women. Once again, a supposedly noncomparative right turns out 
to be comparative in structure and content. 
 
 The idea that one should be treated according to all of one’s relevant individual character-
istics is, of course, highly impractical. How could a decision maker feasibly measure all 
those characteristics? This idea also fails to solve the problem of imperfect proxies. Suppose 
a university admissions office permits applicants to provide any information that they be-
lieve is relevant to admission, and the office carefully reviews all of that information. The 
office would still need to determine criteria of relevance and significance in comparing this 
applicant to others. But whatever criteria are used can then be criticized as imperfectly fur-
thering or constituting the university’s goals or mission. For further discussion, see Hellman, 
supra note 16, ch. 5; Simons, Comparative Right, supra note 3, at 439–40. 
21 Hellman, supra note 1, at 918–21. 
22 Id. at 920. 
23 Id. at 919 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). 
24 Id. (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003)). 
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To be sure, the right to define one’s own gender identity is a right that 
all citizens enjoy. But a universal right is not necessarily a noncompara-
tive right. If, as in this instance, the rationale for the right is to avoid 
comparative injustice, then the right should be characterized as compara-
tive. 
B. THE DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF HELLMAN’S ANALYSIS 
In the final sections of her article, Hellman reviews three doctrinal is-
sues that, she argues, reveal the payoff of the earlier analysis. I will sug-
gest that her analysis helpfully illuminates the third issue she examines, 
but sheds less light upon the first and second. 
1. Is Disparate Impact at Odds with Equal Protection? 
First, Hellman addresses the question whether disparate impact and 
equal protection are at odds. Some scholars and judges, she observes, 
have proclaimed that these doctrines are in serious tension: Title VII’s 
disparate impact doctrine encourages employers to focus on whether an 
employment practice produces disparities disadvantaging minorities or 
women, but equal protection doctrine may prohibit employers from 
changing their practices for the purpose of reducing disparities. Equal 
protection might have this implication if it is understood as prohibiting, 
or subjecting to strict scrutiny, any race-based classification. Much more 
troubling, Hellman notes, is a further implication of this approach: Even 
facially neutral programs, such as efforts by schools to reduce the racial 
achievement gap by offering universal pre-kindergarten or efforts to re-
duce racial disparities in housing or healthcare, might violate equal pro-
tection, because the intent to reduce racial disparities is arguably an ille-
gitimate purpose on this color-blind understanding of the demands of 
equal protection. 
Hellman argues that this supposed tension, asserted by advocates of 
the anticlassification approach, between equal protection and disparate 
impact doctrine (and other policies intended to reduce racial disparities) 
rests on a conceptual mistake. These advocates are improperly combin-
ing a legitimate comparative right (the right not to be subject to a policy 
intended to harm or disadvantage a racial group) with a controversial 
noncomparative right (the right not to have race taken into account in 
how one is treated). As she explains: 
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
94 Virginia Law Review Online [Vol. 102:85 
[T]he claim that awareness of racial impact violates equal protec-
tion[25] derives from a flawed conflation of the two conceptions of the 
wrongful discrimination. It takes the prohibition on racial categories 
from the noncomparative view and the focus on intention from the 
comparative view and grafts them together to form a hybrid argument 
that, though full of sound and fury, signifies nothing. 
 . . . . 
. . . [T]hese two facets of our doctrine (the focus on intention and 
the prohibition on racial classification) derive from different, compet-
ing accounts of what makes discrimination wrong. They cannot be 
fruitfully combined.26  
The focus on intention, she claims, is a plausible comparative right when 
it means an intent to harm or disadvantage, but not when it means an in-
tent to classify on the basis of race, because “[t]here is simply nothing 
obviously wrong with intending to classify on the basis of race.”27 
I agree with Hellman’s conclusion, that equal protection should not be 
understood to prohibit race-conscious efforts to reduce racial hierarchies 
or racial disparities, especially when the programs adopted to further 
these ends are themselves racially neutral. But I do not believe that the 
conclusion follows from her premises. In the first place, as I suggested 
above, the right not to have race taken into account is quite plausibly 
understood as a comparative rather than a noncomparative right. In 
claiming that there is nothing obviously wrong with intending to classify 
on the basis of race, Hellman is asserting her own (quite defensible) 
normative view, but she thereby departs from the interpretive, rather 
than normative, stance that she otherwise takes in this article. (Note, too, 
that she could similarly state that there is nothing obviously wrong with 
classifying on the basis of race; yet she is willing to credit the anticlassi-
 
25 Here, Hellman frames her conclusion in a misleading and exaggerated way. She objects 
to “the claim that awareness of racial impact violates equal protection,” id. at 924, and to the 
argument “that equal protection prohibits the awareness of racial impact that disparate im-
pact requires.” Id. at 900. But no one claims that awareness alone is unconstitutional. Rather, 
the claim is that actors violate equal protection if they possess that awareness and then en-
gage in intentional efforts to reduce or ameliorate racial disparities. This claim, although still 
ultimately unpersuasive, is much more plausible. 
26 Id. at 924–28. 
27 Id. at 929. 
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fication principle as a coherent, though unpersuasive, understanding of 
the wrong of discrimination.) 
Secondly, even if the anticlassification principle is understood as a 
noncomparative right, Hellman has offered no argument why compara-
tive and noncomparative right claims should not be combined, either in 
this context or more generally.28 In many situations, combining these 
different types of rights is perfectly acceptable. Recall the earlier exam-
ple in which comparative equality principles provide that defendant A 
should receive the same sentence as defendant B because their participa-
tion in a criminal endeavor is identical. Now suppose the judge has al-
ready sentenced A to three years, but the judge then determines that she 
should have sentenced A to five years. And suppose that a noncompara-
tive principle provides that, once A has been sentenced, A’s sentence 
may not be increased. Then, the judge could legitimately combine the 
comparative and noncomparative principles and sentence B to three 
years. 
2. Why We Are Confused About Rationality Review 
Hellman next addresses why courts and commentators are so con-
fused about whether rationality review is toothless or instead has some 
bite, and, if the latter, about when it has bite. She concludes that the 
Equal Protection Clause protects individuals from irrational government 
action under the noncomparative conception of discrimination but not 
under the comparative conception. Under the latter, she believes, genu-
ine arbitrariness is not a constitutional problem. 
Specifically, she reasons that if a law irrationally differentiates—for 
example, by forbidding opticians from fitting lenses without a prescrip-
tion but permitting makers of ready-to-wear glasses to fit lenses29—then 
those who are burdened are burdened for no good reason. “If this is a 
constitutional problem, it is a problem because people have an inde-
pendent, noncomparative right that state action that burdens their liberty 
does so for a reason.”30 However, such irrationality is not, she claims, a 
comparative wrong. 
 
28 Indeed, later in the article, Hellman states: “[T]he fundamental interests-equal protection 
line of cases offers an example of how comparative and noncomparative claims can be fruit-
fully combined—in a manner that is clear about the distinct values that are in play.” Id. at 
944. 
29 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488–89 (1955). 
30 Hellman, supra note 1, at 933. 
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These claims are surprising and, in the end, unconvincing. To be sure, 
some laws are irrational and constitutionally problematic for noncom-
parative reasons. The clearest example would be a law that burdens eve-
ryone for no reason. Realistic instances are difficult to conjure up, but 
suppose a dictator, on a whim, requires everyone (including himself) to 
stand still for an hour every day. More realistically, suppose that a gov-
ernment official refuses to do his duty unless he is bribed. He does have 
a reason, but an illegitimate one, for demanding a bribe. And we might 
reasonably conclude that he wrongs each citizen from whom he de-
mands a bribe, regardless of how he treats other citizens. 
But why does Hellman conclude that a similarly arbitrary or illegiti-
mate reason for comparatively unequal treatment is not a distinctive 
constitutional problem? After all, if the dictator requires only some peo-
ple to stand still every day, or demands bribes only of some citizens, he 
has evidently introduced a new problem: the problem of unjust inequali-
ty in treatment. 
Here is her explanation. In the case of stupid, arbitrary laws that bur-
den some but not all people for no reason (or no good or legitimate rea-
son), the right that is infringed is the noncomparative right not to have 
your liberty restricted without good reason, not the comparative right not 
to be treated differently without good reason. Hellman offers the follow-
ing example. Due to stupidity and with no factual basis, a university 
gives preference in admissions to students who wear glasses. This poli-
cy, she says, restricts the liberty of students without glasses for no good 
reason and thus rests on a noncomparative right. But the policy does not 
fail to treat those affected as equals (and thus does not violate a compar-
ative right) because it is simply bad luck that some people with good vi-
sion are disadvantaged by this crazy policy, and comparative equality 
rights are not concerned with mere bad luck. 
This explanation is unpersuasive. First, it is not clear that the 
noncomparative “liberty” interests of university applicants are infringed 
by irrational policies. Hellman here assumes without argument a broad 
understanding both of “liberty” and of what counts as an infringement.31 
Second, she also assumes without sufficient argument a narrower under-
standing of what counts as an infringement of a comparative equality 
 
31 Earlier, Hellman asserts that a “promising candidate” for the source of a noncomparative 
right not to suffer discrimination is the “right to (some degree of) freedom or autonomy.” Id. 
at 913–14. I agree that such a right is very often a plausible source, but property rights are 
another source, as in the “class of one” cases discussed infra. 
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right. Why must any coherent conception of a comparative equality right 
treat disadvantage due to stupid or arbitrary criteria as “bad luck” for 
which the decision maker is not responsible? It is hardly a matter of 
“luck” that students with good vision are disadvantaged by the foolish 
policy: This effect of the policy is entirely foreseeable, and the decision 
maker can readily avoid the effect simply by repealing the policy. The 
“mere bad luck” view is even more implausible in scenarios where the 
disadvantage is more significant than loss of a chance to be admitted to a 
university: suppose a judge sentences B to a longer sentence than simi-
larly situated A simply because she dislikes B’s hairdo. 
I suspect that the real explanation for Hellman’s willingness to recog-
nize a noncomparative right not to be burdened for no reason and un-
willingness to recognize an analogous comparative right not to be disad-
vantaged for no reason is that, as a normative matter, she is disposed to 
endorse the first right but not the second. She apparently views the 
Dworkinian right to be treated as an equal as a right that addresses only 
relatively serious forms of injustice, not trivial inequalities. In her recent 
book, she espouses the view that this egalitarian norm is best understood 
as prohibiting classifications that express denigration of a subgroup of 
citizens,32 and foolish and ineffective laws are not demeaning. Hell-
man’s is a very plausible view of when discrimination is especially 
wrong. But, for purposes of the interpretive task that she sets for herself 
in the current article, it is unpersuasive to claim that other forms of dis-
crimination, including irrational differential treatment for insufficient 
reason, are not genuine violations of comparative equality rights. 
The final example Hellman offers in her irrational treatment section is 
the so-called “class of one” problem. Courts have struggled with the 
question whether, if the government intentionally treats a single citizen 
B differently from, and less favorably than, the way the government 
treated another, similarly situated citizen A in the past, this violates 
equal protection—for example, the government requires an easement 
from B but not from A as a condition of granting a permit. Hellman 
characterizes this as a question of the noncomparative right of B not to 
be treated irrationally. But the issue in these cases is comparative: 
whether the difference in treatment is irrational. There is typically no 
question in these cases that the government could rationally (and consti-
tutionally) have decided in the first instance to impose the same burden 
 
32 Hellman, supra note 16, ch. 2; see Hellman, supra note 1, at 905–06. 
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on A that it later imposed on B. It is thus difficult to see why she be-
lieves this category of cases exemplifies a noncomparative rather than 
comparative right. 
To be sure, rational basis tests are controversial. It is a difficult and 
important question whether, when legislation does not infringe funda-
mental rights and does not employ suspect or quasi-suspect traits, consti-
tutional constraints should be completely, extremely, or only modestly 
deferential.33 But the question is not resolved by whether we character-
ize the constraint as comparative or noncomparative. A comparative 
right can be robust or deferential,34 and the same is true of a noncompar-
ative right. 
3. When Should Equal Protection and Due Process Analysis Be 
Combined? 
The final payoff that Hellman identifies from her analysis is how to 
make sense of cases, including the recent cases of Lawrence v. Texas35 
and Obergefell v. Hodges36, that combine equal protection and due pro-
cess analyses. Here, I find Hellman’s approach illuminating. As she ex-
plains, a comparative view of the wrong of discrimination treats equal 
protection as requiring a comparative analysis, while due process re-
quires a noncomparative analysis. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,37 for exam-
ple, the comparative view treats procreative capacity as a fundamental 
interest that requires strict scrutiny if it is differentially burdened, but not 
simply because it is burdened. By contrast, on a noncomparative view of 
discrimination, both equal protection and due process require noncom-
parative analysis. On this view, the problem in Skinner is the noncom-
parative burden, apart from how others are treated. Similarly, the undif-
ferentiated emphasis on “dignity” in some recent Supreme Court cases is 
problematic on the comparative view of discrimination, because the term 
might encompass either a comparative right (to be treated with respect in 
 
33 For a recent argument that the rational basis test should be strengthened to require proof 
of an actual rather than conceivable permissible purpose and of a meaningful relationship 
between means and ends, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional 
(and Desirable), Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10–11), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2782109 [https://perma.cc/XB27-M7FE]. 
34 See Simons, Logic, supra note 3, at 759–61. 
35 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
36 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015). 
37 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). 
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a nondemeaning way) or a noncomparative right (to have control of 
one’s own destiny including one’s sexual autonomy).38 But this lack of 
differentiation is not problematic on the noncomparative view, because 
both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses focus on whether the 
claimant has an independent entitlement to be treated in a particular 
way. On the noncomparative view, Hellman explains, the fact that some 
are burdened and others are not “may make the underlying rights depri-
vation salient but it isn’t what makes it wrong.”39 In the recent Oberge-
fell opinion, for example, although the court refers to both equal protec-
tion and due process analysis, its references to equal protection are 
largely in service of identifying the important liberty interest at stake 
when gay citizens are denied the right to marry. 
Although I largely agree with this analysis, conceiving of a noncom-
parative right as creating an “independent entitlement” can be mislead-
ing for reasons already noted. A noncomparative right does not invaria-
bly create an unconditional entitlement. Rather, the entitlement is 
sometimes conditional, especially when the decision maker has discre-
tion whether to provide the benefit (or alleviate the burden) in question. 
For example, statutes burdening the fundamental interest in a meaning-
ful appeal of a state criminal conviction can be understood as problemat-
ic for noncomparative reasons without assuming that there is a constitu-
tional right to such an appeal. The wrong is still noncomparative if the 
injustice of conditioning an appeal on the ability to pay a fee does not 
depend on how others are treated. On this view, such a fee requirement 
is akin to a requirement that forbids all defendants, rich or poor, from 
furnishing a trial transcript to the appellate court.40 Thus, the noncom-
parative view espoused by Justice Harlan in equal protection-
fundamental interest cases could apply even in cases where the interest 
at issue is constitutionally optional.41 Similarly, state governments are 
free to decide to get out of the business of recognizing marriages entire-
ly, leaving “marriage” as a religious rather than secular, civil law cate-
gory. In that sense, the right to marry is constitutionally optional. But 
once the state recognizes marriage and permits significant social, legal, 
and economic benefits to flow to married persons, it has a noncompara-
 
38 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (finding an injury to a per-
son’s dignity to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
39 Hellman, supra note 1, at 947. 
40 See Simons, Comparative Right, supra note 3, at 470–71. 
41 Hellman, supra note 1, at 948. 
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tive duty not to deny that status to persons unless it has a very weighty 
reason to do so. 
Finally, the Obergefell opinion, although focused on the denial of the 
freedom to marry, also emphasizes egalitarian concerns, including the 
concern that excluding gays from marriage demeans and stigmatizes 
them. And it is telling that the court’s actual holding is framed in com-
parative terms: “[T]he State laws challenged by Petitioners in these cas-
es are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples 
from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex 
couples.”42 Insofar as states are free to impose a significant range of 
conditions and restrictions upon marriage, and insofar as states differ 
considerably from one another in the nature and scope of these re-
strictions, we must conclude that the noncomparative right to marry, alt-
hough rhetorically important in Obergefell, is not a complete explana-
tion of the scope of the Court’s ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite my disagreements with Professor Hellman about how one 
should draw the distinction between comparative and noncomparative 
injustice and about the implications of that distinction, I share her view 
that the distinction is crucial in identifying the scope and content of, and 
the justifications for, specific legal rights not to suffer discrimination. 
Any satisfactory account of the wrong of discrimination must attend to 
the important questions she raises in this perceptive and original article. 
 
 
42 135 S. Ct. at 2605 (emphasis added). 
